Nations Respond: role of china
On 25 November 1950, a day after United Nations and Republic of Korea forces began the offensive they expected would complete the unification of Korea, Communist China countered with a terrific, and very successful offensive of its own. Within a few days, the Chinese onslaught reversed the UN/ROK northward drive in central and western North Korea, devastating several South Korean divisions, badly tearing up the U.S. Second Division and forcing the rest of the UN command to rapidly withdraw southwards to escape destruction.
On 27 November, near eastern North Korea's Chosin Reservoir, the Chinese fell on the First Marine Division and a nearby U.S. Army task force, almost wiping out the latter and provoking a Marine response that ranks as one of history's greatest feats of arms. Over the following two weeks, the Marines battled their way to the port of Hungnam, from which they would be evacuated by sea. In their wake were the ruins of the opposing Chinese divisions, which suffered so many casualties from combat and the bitterly cold weather that they were out of action for months.
By 25 January 1951, the Chinese and the reconstituted North Korean forces had been so badly depleted that a new UN offensive was possible. If the great Chinese offensive had shown the United States and its allies that there would be no easy victories in mainland Asia, their response gave the Communists a painfully expensive lesson in the vulnerability of their manpower-intensive armies to the vast mobile firepower of Western ground, air and naval forces.
On 27 November, near eastern North Korea's Chosin Reservoir, the Chinese fell on the First Marine Division and a nearby U.S. Army task force, almost wiping out the latter and provoking a Marine response that ranks as one of history's greatest feats of arms. Over the following two weeks, the Marines battled their way to the port of Hungnam, from which they would be evacuated by sea. In their wake were the ruins of the opposing Chinese divisions, which suffered so many casualties from combat and the bitterly cold weather that they were out of action for months.
By 25 January 1951, the Chinese and the reconstituted North Korean forces had been so badly depleted that a new UN offensive was possible. If the great Chinese offensive had shown the United States and its allies that there would be no easy victories in mainland Asia, their response gave the Communists a painfully expensive lesson in the vulnerability of their manpower-intensive armies to the vast mobile firepower of Western ground, air and naval forces.